One thing that I came to believe following the decision from the supremes concerning Obammacare, was that the judges were simply politicians in robes. With that in the background, I ran across this article. There were a bunch of quotes I pulled out of this article – enough that I have a hard time deciding what to post here to whet your appetite to read the remainder of the article. Well, here it goes:

This is because unlike the laws of nature, political laws are not consistent. The law human beings create to regulate their conduct is made up of incompatible, contradictory rules and principles; and, as anyone who has studied a little logic can demonstrate, any conclusion can be validly derived from a set of contradictory premises. This means that a logically sound argument can be found for any legal conclusion.

When a sound argument is found, then, as in the case of empirical reasoning, one naturally concludes that one’s legal hypothesis has been shown to be correct, and further, that all competing hypotheses are therefore incorrect.
This is the fallacy of legal reasoning. Because the legal world is comprised of contradictory rules, there will be sound legal arguments available not only for the hypothesis one is investigating, but for other, competing hypotheses as well. The assumption that there is a unique, correct resolution, which serves so well in empirical investigations, leads one astray when dealing with legal matters. Kingsfield, who is well aware of this, knows that Arnie and Ann have both produced legitimate legal arguments for their competing conclusions.
Because the law is made up of contradictory rules that can generate any conclusion, what conclusion one finds will be determined by what conclusion one looks for, i.e., by the hypothesis one decides to test. This will invariably be the one that intuitively “feels” right, the one that is most congruent with one’s antecedent, underlying political and moral beliefs. Thus, legal conclusions are always determined by the normative assumptions of the decisionmaker.

For they have never learned Professor Kingsfield’s lesson that it is impossible to reach an objective decision based solely on the law. This is because the law is always open to interpretation and there is no such thing as a normatively neutral interpretation. The way one interprets the rules of law is always determined by one’s underlying moral and political beliefs.

What a legal rule means is always determined by the political assumptions of the person applying it.

The observation that the legal system is highly stable is, of course, correct, but it is a mistake to believe that this is because the law is determinate. The stability of the law derives not from any feature of the law itself, but from the overwhelming uniformity of ideological background among those empowered to make legal decisions.

But this agreement is due to the common set of normative presuppositions the judges share, not some immanent, objective meaning that exists within the rules of law.

Today, long-standing precedents are more freely overruled, novel theories of liability are more frequently accepted by the courts, and different courts hand down different, and seemingly irreconcilable, decisions more often. In addition, it is worth noting that recently, the chief complaint about the legal system seems to concern the degree to which it has become “politicized.” This suggests that as the ideological solidarity of the judiciary breaks down, so too does the predictability of legal decisionmaking, and hence, the stability of the law. Regardless of this trend, I hope it is now apparent that to assume that the law is stable because it is determinate is to reverse cause and effect. Rather, it is because the law is basically stable that it appears to be determinate. It is not rule of law that gives us a stable legal system; it is the stability of the culturally shared values of the judiciary that gives rise to and supports the myth of the rule of law.

By making the king appear to be an integral part of God’s plan for the world rather than an ordinary human being dominating his fellows by brute force, the public could be more easily persuaded to bow to his authority. However, when the doctrine of divine right became discredited, a replacement was needed to ensure that the public did not view political authority as merely the exercise of naked power. That replacement is the concept of the rule of law.

The myth of impersonal government is simply the most effective means of social control available to the state.

Although only the Crits may recognize it, all are engaged in a political struggle to impose their version of “the good” on the rest of society. And as long as the law remains the exclusive province of the state, this will always be the case.

As long as the public identifies order with law, it will believe that an orderly society is impossible without the law the state provides. And as long as the public believes this, it will continue to support the state almost without regard to how oppressive it may become.

Were the distinction between order and law well-understood, the question of whether a state monopoly of law is the best way to ensure an orderly society could be intelligently discussed. But this is precisely the question that the state does not wish to see raised. By collapsing the concept of order into that of law, the state can ensure that it is not, for it will have effectively eliminated the idea of a non-state generated order from the public mind.

Free markets supply human wants better than state monopolies precisely because they allow an unlimited number of suppliers to attempt to do so

On the other hand, the source of the law which produces oppression and social division is almost always the state…If the purpose of the law really is to bring order to human existence, then it is fair to say that the law actually made by the state is precisely the law that does not work.

The current state-supplied legal system is adversarial in nature, pitting the plaintiff or prosecution against the defendant in a winner-take-all, loser-get-nothing contest. The reason for this arrangement has absolutely nothing to do with this procedure’s effectiveness in settling disputes and everything to do with the medieval English kings’ desire to centralize power.

For with the acceptance of the myth of the rule of law comes a blindness to the fact that laws are merely the commands of those with political power, and an increased willingness to submit oneself to the yoke of the state.

After reading this, I am struck by a few items. One, I disagree with some of his descriptions of historical interpretation in the realm of the 80’s, but I allow this as a matter of opinion. Next, I note that the description he gave is much more like the original set up of this country’s government – a weak central government with more independent cooperative states working in concert on areas out of their individual jurisdictions. The formation of the jury also allowed the application of local morality and law to be applied opposed to a generalized central law which we now experience. The desire that all be under the same law has been put to the test and found lacking in our present government as the political animals exempt themselves from the laws they pass. Beyond this point, I’ll let you read and think about the possibilities.